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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
PIaintiff-Respondent; ) 
) COURT OF APPEALS 
VS. ) 
) NO- B90346-CA 
EDWARD DAY„ ) 
> 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 0£ APPEALS 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals by the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Section 
78~-2a-3 (j) and Section 77-35-26 (2) (b), U.C.A. , 1953 as amend-
ed „ 
STATEMENT OF THE: NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the* denial of Appellant's motion for 
a new trial of the charge of Rape, a first degree felony, of 
which he was convicted in the Seventh Judicial District Court for 
San Juan County, State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court Brr in failing to grant appellant 
a continuance to obtain and file affidavit(s) in support of his 
motion and was the Court's refusal to grant a continuance a.n 
abuse of discretion? 
2. Did the District Court err in failing to provide the 
appellant with appointed legal counsel to assist him in his 
motion or other, more appropriate writ proceedings, and was such 
•failure a denial of due process and equal protection of the laws? 
3. While the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 
77-35-24 requires parties to file a motion for a new trial within 
10 days of the imposition of sentence, did the District Court Brv 
in determining that Appellant could not have a new trial because 
of the 10 day limitation when that Rule allows the Court to grant 
a new trial "upon it's own initiative", and was the Court's 
refusal to consider the matter a denial of due process and an 
abuse of the Court's discretion? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourteenth Amendment, U- S„ Constitution 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution 
STATEMENT OF T>IE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-32-1 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-32-2 
Utah COCIE* of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-35-24 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-35-26 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3 (j) 1953 as 
amended 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 and Rule 61 
The? Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (A) (4) 
STATEMENT OF TJHE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of defendant-appellant's 
motion for a new trial. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 16, 19S7, Appellant was convicted of Rape, a 
first deqree felony, in the Seventh Judicial District Court for 
San Juan County, State of Utah, and on October 6, 1987 he was 
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sentenced to serve five years to life in the Utah State prison,, 
On October 19, 1988,, Appellant filed a Motion -i:or a New Trial and 
that motion was heard on November 10, 1988 in the Seventh Judi-
cial D i s t r i .c t C o u r t f o r S a n J u a n C o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h „ J u d q e 
Boyd Bunnell presiding. 
DISPOSITION AT. TRIAL COURT 
The trial court denied defendant-appellant's motion for a 
new trial on the grounds that defendant didn't attach any affida-
vits in support of his motion and on the grounds that Section 77-
3 5-24, U t a hi C o d e o f C r i m i n a 1 P r o c e d u r e , r e q u i r e s t hi a t a rn o t i o n 
for a new trial must be? filed within .1.0 days of pronouncement of 
sentence„ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
T h e a p p e 11 a n t s e e k s a r e v e r s a 1 o f h i s c o n v i c t i o n a n d a n e w 
t r i a I or i n t h e a 11 em at i ve , t h e r eman d i n g of h i s mot i on f or a 
new trial to the district court to allow appellant time? to obtain 
and file affidavits in support of his motion and to direct the 
trial court to order a new trial upon it's own initiative if the 
new 1 y obtained E^ vi dence war r ant.s. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and Appellant, Edward Day ("Day") was tried by the 
Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan County, State of 
Utah, without a jury, on Information charging Day with Rape, a 
first degree felony, and was found guilty by the Court. He was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of five years to 
life on October 6, 1987. 
• 3. 
On October 19, 1988, more than one year later, acting with-
out counsel, Day tiled a Motion -for Mew Trial in the Seventh 
J u d i c: i a 1 D i s t r i c t. C o u r t o n t h e b a s i s o f n e w 1 y d i s c: o v e r e d e v i -
dence. Day's motion states that the "evidence will be presented 
at the Court at the time of the? hearing on this motion, but 
consists of persons who have become known to this Defendant, who 
could not have? become known prior to the time of trial, who would 
testify that the victim in this case met with the Defendant under 
circumstances where the victim intended to engage in sexual 
intercourse. n 
The State of Utah, through the San Juan County Attorney, 
filed a memorandum in opposition to Day's motion, wh.i>ch was made 
under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rather than 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in the 
State's memorandum, the State objected on the grounds thats 
1. A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 must be filed not 
later than 10 days after entry of Judgment. 
2. Under Sub-section 4 of Rule 59, the defendant is re-
quired to file supporting affidavit(s) giving opposing counsel 
the opportunity to understand the nature of complaints made. 
3. While Day's motion itself contains a "hint" as to what 
the new information may be, the State wrote thaxt Rule 61 requires 
that new information must be weighty in order to overcome the 
hurdle of harmless error, and that by simply producing another 
witness to bolster evidence presented at trial does not meet the 
burden of Rule 59 and 61 to allow granting a new trial. 
The Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan 
County, Judge Boyd Bunnell, presiding, heard Day's motion on 
November 10, 1988 in the San Juan County Courthouse. Mr. Day was 
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present and the State was represented by the San Juan County 
Attorney. 
At the beginning of the hearing, (Transcript 2 ) , Day told 
the Court that he would like to present a Motion for Continuance 
on the hearing of his Motion for Mew Trial, apparently, after 
reading the State's memorandum in opposition to this motion. The 
Court did not respond to Day's request for a continuance, but 
instead, proceeded to discuss the problems with Day's motion 
under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, (T.2,3). 
The Court read most of Rule 24 to Day, pointing out that Day's 
motion failed to be accompanied by affidavits in support of his 
motion (T„3), and that such a motion should be made within 10 
days of sentencing (T.4). The Court noted that Day's motion was 
filed much more than 10 days after sentencing (T.3). Mr. Day, 
obviously acting without counsel, then indicated to the Court 
that he followed the Federal Rules in making his motion and asked 
the court if he had the right to appeal the court's decision 
(T.4). The judge instructed Day that the judge did not practice 
law and could not advise Day (T.4>, and then formally ruled on 
the motion denying it because "the rules were not complied with, 
and timeliness in filing it <T.4). Day appeals from the denial 
of his motion, and because the court would not allow him a con-
tinuance before ruling on the motion. 
Appellant contends that if he had been given time to obtain 
the required affidavits and had received court appointed counsel 
D 
to obtain the affidavits, those affidavits would contain state-
ments from persons who conversed with the victim after she re-
ported the alleged rape, and who the victim told that she was not 
raped, but was angry with the defendant and was claiming rape to 
retaliate. One of these affiants talked with the victim the same 
morning the victim reported the rape and shortly after the victim 
had been examined by a medical doctor. Prior to sentencing, 
Appellant was unaware of the knowledge these affiants have, and 
in some cases, never knew of the existence of some affiants- In 
any event, Appellant could not have discovered the evidence these 
affiants could have provided at trial. Such evidence, once 
presented, would rebut the claims of the victim and would demon-
strate the impropriety of the victim's testimony, which testimony 
resulted in the conviction of the defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court erred in failing to grant a continu-
ance to allow Defendant time to obtain and file affidavits in 
support of his motion, and such failure to grant a continuance 
with an abuse of discretion. 
2. The District Court Brred in failing to assign or appoint 
legal counsel to defendant to assist him in obtaining the affida-
vits and in properly presenting his motions. Such failure was a 
denial of due process and equal protection of the laws. 
3. While Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-35-24 
requires parties to file a motion for a new trial within 10 days 
6 
oi imposition of sentence, when with due diligence, the defendant 
could not have discovered the new evidence he seeks to present 
until after the 10 day period had elapsed, the District Court 
erred in denying Appellant time to obtain the affidavits for the 
Court's review because Rule 24 allows the Court to grant a new 
trial "upon it's own initiate?" and the wording of Rule 24 does 
not restrict the court to the 10 day period. Such refusal to 
allow a full review of Appellant's claims is arbitrary and denial 
of due process and is an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT'S NOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
Appeals arB normally taken from formal court decisions which 
the court supports with findings of fact and conclusions of law« 
In this case, Appellant appeals from the court's failure to even 
consider appellant's motion for continuance to allow time to 
obtain affidavits which would more fully advise the court of the 
nature of s.ny new evidence that might justify allowing the appel-
lant a new trial. 
Appellant, imprisoned in the Utah State Prison, appeared 
before the court acting as his own counsel, and at the outset of 
the proceeding, when addressed by the court concerning his Motion 
for a New Trial, informed the court that he wanted the court to 
consider a Motion for Continuance on his scheduled Motion for a 
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New Trial. The court's response did not address Appellant's 
Motion tor a Continuance, but pointed out that Appellant -failed 
to accompany his motion with affidavits telling the Court what 
the new evidence would be and that his motion had not been filed 
within ten days of commitment (T. 2,3). 
Appellant, representing himself, discovered from the State's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's motion that his motion 
should be accompanied by affidavits or other supporting authority 
to be complerte. Because he was confined in prison and did not 
have the means to retain legal counsel to file a complete motion 
and be free to travel to those recently discovered affiants who 
he had been told by family members were ready to testify in his 
behalf, Appellant requested a continuance so that he could have 
time to present the court with sufficient new information to 
persuade the court that it should grant him a new trial. 
He has been informed that family members, residing in Moab, 
Utah, since the time of his commitment have met several persons, 
not known to Appellant at the time of trial, who in conversation 
with the victim, were told by the victim that she consented to 
the sexual intercourse and was not raped, but being angry with 
Appellant, accu^Bd him of ra.pi.nq her. These? are persons who have 
personal relationships with the victim, but did not have any 
relationship with the Appellant. 
While the District Court Judge has it within his discretion 
to decide whether to grant motions before the Court, his deci-
sions should be thoughtful, and based upon findings. Rule 24, 
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Utah Rules ai Criminal Procedure does require parties to accompa-
ny a motion for a new trial with affidavits and does require that 
such motions he filed within ten days of imposition of sentence, 
but Rule 24 also allows the Court to grant a new trial "upon its 
own initiative", and the Court did not make its decision with any 
reference to that provision. While the Court has discretion, 
that discretion should be exercised in compliance within statuto-
ry provisions and within the bounds of the Court's function of 
providing due process and equal protection through a full hearing 
on the matter. 
The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A) (4), requires that 
nA judge should accord to every person who is legally interested 
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according 
to law-" While Rule 24 does not require the Court to give the 
Appellant additional time to obtain the necessary affidavits, 
Rule 24 (b) states that "If additional time is required to pro-
cure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on 
the motion for such time as it deems reasonable." The Court 
loses nothing by granting Appellant's Motion for a Continuance 
and allowing Appellant additional time to obtain the affidavits 
so the Court can fully review the proffered new evidence. The 
Court is then in a fully informed position to decide if the new 
evidence is sufficient for the Court, upon it's own initiative, 
to grant a new trial. Since, from a reading of Rule 24, it 
appears that the Court is not restricted by the 10 day limita-
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tion, Appellant would have the opportunity -for a, new trial, and 
i -f he is innocent as he maintains he is, he would be -freed -from 
prison. To not a 11 ow h i m t hie opportun i. t y t o be f LIi 1 y i \ear d , as 
required by The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (A) (4) may be 
a n a b u. s e o f d i s c r e t ion b y t hi e C o u r t„ 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL TO DEFENDANT 
AI thou an \ :: j s nearly axiomatic that a claim of error 
cdf:!-.-' •
 : • • •- ' -=e first time on a p p e a l , Stj^ iii.. Loe v 732 p» 
2d 1 15 (LJLah 1987) » 1 he Appel 1 ant asserts •* : 
Court erred by not appointing legal counsel althougn Appellant 
did not specifically request counsel and the Court did not :™uie 
on any such request - From the r&cord , i t. was apparent L.
 ;-^  i. rie 
was unable ic i^"uper]y represent himsel f
 9 and because he was 
inc arc era tec _- • • •• -•- -J not -d lihprfv to meet K; \:h and 
obtain affidavits -- •.•^  those persons ^no :-;ad come = ::>• v.. i 
evidence that could Drove* the victif*. M Appellant s r". .-,-•-: :• ^  . ai 
had misrepresented cnn r .-,  >. . - - •--> . trie court-
The question of denial of Appellant's right to due process 
and e q LI a 1 protectio n o f t h e 1 a w s b e c a u s e t he D i s t r i. c t C o u r t d i d 
not appoint counsel at the St <-•  Lf s -.•-•;:.• --.- - '•*- • ••-i--' - in a 
* -''-v • <-•!-* ot const i l.ul'i or ;<•-',' '.id statutory i/'-o-. -J : ; o n s , u-'j. CM r . J 1 i ngs 
;• •' -: 'ir-r Liant s sit u a t j c- n . 
1
 p.? C o n s t a t u . t i on p-* U t a h „ A:'"": . :.. , : :i i .-. ••; . t e s 
t h a t a l l a c c LI s e L ...: - c r i m i n a 1 p !•- o s e c LI t i o n s h a v e t n e " • * r o 
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coLInsa 1 bef or e* f i na 1 j udg m e n t , but cioas n ot reqLAi r e the same 
assistance tor discretionary appeals or writ proceedings- The 
U t a hi C o ci e of C r i m i n a 1 P r o c e? d LI r e i m p 1 e m e n t s t h e c o n s t :i. t n t i Q n a 1 
standard in Section 77-32-2 by requiring the assignment oi coun-
sel t : G i g e n t persons who could be confined the de-fend ant 
requests it or i f the court so orders* • •- or- ~r"7-32-l, Utah 
Code of Cr i mi na 1 Pr oced ur e? r eqLIi r es 3. oc a 1 .j ur i sdiet i on s t: o pr o-
vick •'-->;- '":' •-•  rQunse 1 for i ndi gents in defense of the prosecution 
and the taku ig of a first appoa : . ~l v 
r e q u i r e for p a y m e n t of c o u n s e l ori "oi \iur <^\c\ ^nfr^&^uoi \ i ih ~o u t>~ 
11 o r i a r y a p pea 1 SB o t ci i s c: r e 1: i o n a r y writ proceedings. u ! -1 a wever , 
t hat st at ute says those st anc.1 ar cjs mandated by the se.... i on arB 
minimum standards, and apparently leaves to the discretion at t.ie 
court, a determinate • -.sther a defendant should have ap-
pointed counsel to &in n subsequent discretionary appeals or 
writ proceedings. 
1 n t h i s c a s e , a 1 •' ' i > M • j I i A p p e 1 1 a i \ t c:i i d i ::) t a s k f o i !:  h e a p -
p o i n t m e n t of cc'''t i•.• *?] . i •^> -natter" w a s br"ought to t h e a 1 1 e n t i on of 
t h e C c:) u r t b y A p p e 11 a n t ' s i n c o m p 1 e t e m o t i o n , A p p e 11 a n t " s c o m m e n t 
that •-.?•• had u s e d t n e ,~e-:..,era _• -:...•- . *': • •->• •••;• Ti i a i to 
dEEji st h J IT* •. >" •. n j. s fTiot. J. on cind t.he l_-our "L s ov-.- n e\-: p 1 at!a1.1 on « pr omp t — 
'•ii-.PH'; : a n t s request for i e n a ] ad i i -:::••? +'-om t h e Con;-4.;, t h a t 
rJ-e j udge GJG not p r a c t i c e law an: . . . . . . •:..-'." '" e 
l e g a l a a v j : ^ t o A p p e l l a n t t h a t ne needed .."•', 3 ; . 
••••:.• i . : " " - ""•::•••••' ::-r ^  r P = '"'iii-ii -• ^ e Cou r t nas dea;. 1 w i t h unci j. SSLI^ of 
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denial of due? process and equal protection of the laws when 
defendants are not provided counsel in discretionary appeals or 
writ proceedings. However, in those cases before that court, 
each defendant had already taken ''it '" appeal - ' ri:l!n,!1 had 
received assistance counsel ' '' -
 lM *_-»--- nnv] -;f. i o jroceed — 
i ngs , and was st i 1 : _.--.tt empt i no > any 
other means available.. w-'i?ri • ' ^-' defendan, ^' v. •»*•--• a >,di= "O 
1D"3 - • n',-•-•• iJ- counsel by Hit- state- r ' an v ~
 t i-t dr-mal -.. ::ue 
process a no •_-:-L:L>,:...I p r o t e c t i o n w e r e m a d e - - ..-
In R O B S V., *ioff itt„ 4 i 7 I,. L. .- -. 94 3 B Ct. 2 4 3 7 , 41 
L . . F..V... 1 -i ' -•• \ '•' "^  • -i.---- r • determined that when a defendant 
has been affordec counsel at trial and the indigent's first 
appeal of r; ghf -^ -nm his correction,, •• ,s net a violation of the 
du.^ process .. .: •.<•:•:. r-' •' _iause of the Four 
teenth Amendment ;-o trie U „ S» Const i tut.. on for a state to refuse 
to provide counsel for other, discretionary appeals or writ pro-
ceedings, ii- _ i > ^tcite 
initiates d' t iu. ~ on 'C»» * . • •• i .* . je~> M.-J=.WI1 I «m a 
person presumed inno>:...er-1 ^ r< or* • e f t-*< >n'" u • • ! r\• ooyond a reasonab 1 e 
doubt,11 and by takina <=:• • . • he state is 
obligated to provide indigents with the same pi- ©taction against 
the state's action m a t rnr>r& a-ffluBnt defendants would have. The 
appeals process is initiated :.. - tne a •-•.'•.'-• =t.-:. -.,.-•. • ^s 
decided that i r; :s nr.t the obhgatici:-. -. * tne state : :;:• uay ror or 
::"•:.'•-•
 : e ••••:, ,.; v ppeateci a p p e a l s or frivolous a c t i o n s 
simp 1. y b e* c a u s e m o r e a. f f 3. u e n t defend a n t s c a n a f f o r ci them,, R e c o q -
razing that situations with various defendants differ, the court 
emphasized that " 'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the 
State arid the individual dealini uiih tne States regardless of 
--•••-; '• :•..-=•• individuals m Lne E?-?.^ C tu^t: -.n ;r\ r:n h ^ated„!i 
"'s .pr^l^cic r-.f equal * * '' the Li. 5„ 
Supreme Cour ' • . 1-0155,, supra, at f . o .-, LJI f jdUiuu that "The 
-! .T L-e-v- ••- • .;. .-r-rri- 'does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages', nor does it r ec- : - 7:-tate •" 
' eq u a 1 3 z e e c o n o m 1 c c o n d 111 o n s ": ,, "' T r * e c o u r t states that "7 -r-s e 
State '• • redures which ; ^ -:-. 'c -T India'ant d9tend:-nt 
"entirely cut ot- rrofii any appeal at a.: ,„•.•-. - "is 
indigency, or extend to such indigent defendants merelv •: 
inqless ri;v.--!, ,..::.
 ; .. ,••-.••--.-- .-?j r.er K C - ^ J H I ] ! . . \ r c u m = s t a n c e s 
h a v e a ' o-ean 1 n g f u 1. arJ P a a 1 .  ' '' T n e •:.: o- Ar t c o n c i u.G e S t n a~\ 
quest i on i s not one of abso 1 utes , but one of degrees. " 
In the present case, Appslldi - f" appeal the trial 
court's decision or exercise his first nqru of appeal to a 
higher court„ He returned to the trial court with ris Hotion for 
a New Trial only when he oi..u iu.. L.ueu ' -: m~ v •; tori ous e-/i 
dence that could p r o ; p his i nnDcence EW^I his actions go to the 
•-- • ,1 dence as it was presented at r r j .,; „ ,.?;>;: r ^' , -1 
some errorr. -;; a collateral a.'., ".aci : --^  . • -• • p-: -""'- • :r/ t:he 
ca,f't in procedure. ;his Appellant nas not attempted *; •:; r e p e a t -
ed i y p~ L . •.  ;-. • • ;--' • •-.'--.-• -'••• :i.. in appointed counsel, : . L : rpw, 
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having what he considers substantive new evidence that will prove 
his innocence in a new trial, needs the assistance of counsel to 
help him o b t a i n a f f i d a v i t s i n s u p p a r •« • • t !• i a t e v i d e n c e a n d t h e n , 
proper] v present it to tt re tf ial court. 
I r • T * -.;; ==. m a 11. e r , t h e d e f e n d a n t w i 11 b e d e n i e d d u e p r o c e s s i f 
the court does not appoint counsel because he is incarcerated, 
unable to meet wivn -no LIDLCUH proper •. >f-ti davits to1- the court's 
r e v : • •':<-. .E .1 ::! p r » - . -. • .,. • .-'
 A al 
c o 1.1 r t s h o u 1 d •  ° • • e . - s i t e r e s t a f j u s t .3, c e a n c! u p o n 1 1 s o w n i n 1 1 i a — 
t i v e , g r a n t A p p e l l a n t a new t r i a l . Be?cause due p r o c e s s " e m p h a -
s i z e s f a 1 v t 1 e s s fa e t w e e 1 1 t i \ e 3 1 a t e a 1 1 d t i 1 e 11 1 d 1" • i d 1 1 a 1 "' ^:. '.-• - :•-
thi s part i cul ar Appel 1 ant has not previ ousl y asked 1 or ••• revi ew 
of the trial by any court, to deprive h.i.r< •.••* -ne assistance ,; 
counsel to obtain and present evidence pe* z >.-. • •. > 1^ 
issues of 11 i! iocence or guilt. i infair ly blocks n •. - abi I. :  t y • 1 
present new evidence and blocks his access to full and complete 
due process. 
If Appellant .is not provided counsel, ! -.:• w:. . . p*:- denied 
eni v-: "-.-•-.r v::tion ot t h e laws b e c a u s e , box p, incarcerated, -••id 
unabJ e r. o obtain proper affidavits*, he w> •,. I ;:. e e n p ^ ^ •/ • •.= : 
f r or-' 3n v mean 1 nq + ;.; 1 r ecoLAr se ' o 1 • r,*-•- ,;;;GLAr t s to Dr esent * he? 11 ew 
counsel , hi ~. pe^: .• • w.; -^n p < •- PvP i.on • .jr -• Netv . r J. e*l ^as simp] y a 
"meani nql ess r:t.;,p: -or .• en the S u p r e m e Court ., p Ross ,supra„sai d 
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While the trial court may be correct in ruling that 
Appellant's motion is contrary to the rule requiring that such 
motions be? f i 1 ed f or the court t o not appoi nt cou.nse 1 to ai d bathi 
Appellant and the Court in reviewing the proffered new evidence. 
In the event the evidence cou 1 d prave the .1 f-• n o r e n c e •*-<J; Apne 1 • a- t ; 
the court has a duty, in the interest • •\iL* . 
evidence and, upon : t •:> ..iwi i -nj. '...jative, order a new tr ial. 
T T 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING 
THAT A NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AVAILABLE 
Utah Code? of Cr i mi na 1 Pr ocedure, Sect i on 77-35-24
 i r equi re?s 
that a motion -for a new t r i a l , -filed by a party must be filed 
w.:. "• :-,-\ys of the imposition of 5snr'-!:.-- j-Jnw--"--"-r, Rule 24 
also D<" o •/! c.iv=-. "'"he court may. i ipor. it s CH-..- , iitiative, 
gran L ™ ,<"•• -:" • • l->- -nterest of ji sat ice there • - •.-
error or i nw », » . ' <*• ' ' - < • - - • - - ' , , 
the right" -- * - .- . t , " 
The rights o-f Apoellant were adverse! v a4" tec ted 
st ant ial way b-. tne v. est i monv • •.' \ -v _-_-•...;.• •- -•-• -
victed on that testimony and sentenced •' c- priso; ^e appeared 
before the d i s t r* i c t c o u r t u p o n h i s o w n m o t :\ a n , p. n d r» s t h e - '- • * - >~ 
determined, his motion did not fall wit hi: t :i •• ^ 
by ~,ubpa.r&qr&pi- •:; •• iMj.le 2 - ] , H o w e v e r , w i t h potent:i::2 • •-w 
evicier---;- t *•• -• -. • -•;.: v .,.: i ex. the testimony oi the victim uemg 
brought, to tne atcenL.ion of the court, the court is empowered by 
subparagraph '-.a.;1 to grant a new tr. -'21 < , a-r Ler reviewing T ne 
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attidavits that would reveal the nature of the new evidence, the 
c o u r t d e t e r r n i n e s t h e e v i d e n c a w a r r a n t a a n e w t r i a 1 » W h e n s u. c h 
potential new evidence comes to the attention o-f the court, the 
court should inquire into its substance, e,nd 11 it appears that 
t h e n e w e v i d e n c e h a s m e r i. t, 11 »e c o u r t should g r a n t a n e w t r i a 1 „ 
T o r e f u s e to cons i d e r a n d r e v i e w t h a c 1 a i m a d e v i cl e n c e w o u Id b e 
,-:
r
" LJ i':..-• af" \. - anu t her ef or e a cieni a 1 of due process, and an 
abuse ot tne court s discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Th e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u 1 d h a v e r u 1 e d o n A p p e 1 Ian t '" B o r a 1 
motion tor a Continuance, granting it, and should have appointed 
:.ne „ cur t. rit- i oi i!' L o t ~ rie •••u!:> = . t a i i o 
t--
i I'np*" . L'f i. a t y 
i n i t \ a t i v e , s h o 
i-'-espe-." 
.!. n •:. 11 a v i -. v. \. m e s L i jfiori - „ -i6 L :-ur !. , i. - */- c ^  ^  
w * r i a J. 
Attorney for Appe.; 
37 East Main St. 
P. G„ Box 9:3 
Price, UT 84501 
(801) 637-7011 
DELIVERY OF CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that -four true and correct copies of the 
•f or eqai ng Br i et o-f Appel 1 ant were mai 1 ed , postage pr epai d , to the 
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, on this ^Jp^tiJx« day o-f September, 1989. 
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ART. I , § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Land Registration Act. 
The Torrens Act was not unconstitu-
tional as conferring judicial powers on 
registrar of titles. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. 
Brarael, 56 U. 587, 192 P . 375, 11 A. L. R. 
752. 
Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude tlie legis-
lature from prescribing a statute of limi-
tations for time within which to assail 
the regularity or organization of an irri-
gation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 U. 55, 
151 P. 555. 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in 
excluding compensation for partial disa-
bility from silicosis, and in rendering 
remedy under that act exclusive so as to 
abrogate common-law right of action 
therefor, is not unconstitutional as depriv-
ing such employee of his remedy by due 
course of law for injury done to his per-
son. Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Ref. & Min. Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612. 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of 
wrong is substantial r ight, and will not 
be waived by contract except through 
unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 
G8 U. 486, 251 P. 16. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse 
to courts under Workmen's Compensation 
Act concerning question of their ultimate 
liability. Industrial Comin. v. Evans, 52 
U. 394, 174 1\ 825. 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not in-
valid because i t delegates to industrial 
commission the power to hear, consider 
and determine controversies between liti-
gants as to ult imate liability, or their 
property rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus-
trial Coram., 57 U. 246, 194 P. 122. 
Dependents of employee killed by acts 
of third par ty , a stranger to employment, 
are not limited to recovery under Work-
men's Compensation Act exclusively, un-
less they have assigned their rights to 
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 70 U. 441, 261 P. 9. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutional Law©=>322, 324, 327, 328. 
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 709, 711, 
714, 719. 
16 Am. Jur . 2d 718-721, Constitutional 
Law §§ 382-385. 
Law Reviews. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 
Edward L. Barre t t , Jr . , 35 Calif. L. Rev. 
380. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
in Anglo-American Law, Paxton Blair, 29 
Colura. L. Rev. 1. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 248. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Comparable Provision. —acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § Id.- formation or indictment, 77-24-12. 
—acquit ta l or dismissal without judg-
Cross-Eeferences. ment, 77-24-11. 
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5. —acts punishable in different ways, 
Double jeopardy, statutory provision, punishment limited to one, 76-1-23. 
77-1-10. * 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Rut Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
Rut neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5* 
ni
 The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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evidence upon the question of the previous 
conviction. Ex parte Mulhner (1941) 101 U 51, 
117 P 2d 819. 
Review on appeal. 
The facts considered by trial judge, in 
determining what sentence within the legal 
limits he would impose, could not be 
reviewed by Supreme Court, though judge's 
preliminary remarks indicated that he was 
influenced by facts which were brought out in 
another prosecution against the same 
defendant tried before him. State v. Martin 
(1917) 49 U 346,164 P 500. 
Waiver. 
Failure to object to delay in pronouncing 
judgment waived the right to object. Rose v. 
District Court of Millard County (1926) 67 U 
526, 248 P 486. 
77-35-23. Rule 23 — Arrest of judgment. At any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon 
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admit-
ted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judg-
ment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged 
is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defend-
ant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
Appealability of order arresting judgment 
in criminal case, 98 ALR 2d 737. 
Fugitive defendant, refusal to entertain 
motion in arrest of judgment on behalf of, 69 
ALR 2d 848. 
Power of trial court to dismiss defendant 
in criminal case for insufficiency of evidence 
after submitting case to jury or after verdict 
of guilty, 131 ALR 187. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-23, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, § 1. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law O 974-976. 
24 CJS Criminal Law §§ 1514-1555. 
21 AmJur 2d 865-869, Criminal Law 
§§520-524., 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Grounds for motion. 
Under Comp. Laws 1907, §4901, a motion 
in arrest of judgment could be made upon 
defects in information or indictment only. 
Court could not on such a motion review 
alleged errors occurring at the trial, not 
based upon or in any way relating to such 
defects. State v. Mewhinney (1914) 44 U 231, 
139 P 862.. 
Whether defendant in murder prosecution 
had been afforded opportunity to plead to 
information and had been tried without hav-
ing entered plea thereto could properly be 
raised by motion for new trial, but not by 
motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Estes 
(1918) 52 U 572,176 P 271. 
Jurisdictional question was properly raised 
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v. 
Merritt (1926) 67 U 325, 247 P 497. 
Proceedings in which motion allowable. 
Defendant in prosecution for bastardy was 
not entitled to interpose motion in arrest of 
judgment, because bastardy proceeding was 
civil, and not criminal. State v. Kranendonk 
(1932) 79 U 239, 9 P 2d 176. 
77-35-24. Rule 24 — Motion for new trial, (a) The court may, upon 
motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the inter-
est of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. 
The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential 
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion 
for such time as it deems reasonable. 
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(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposi-
tion of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during 
the ten day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position 
as if no trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or 
mentioned either in evidence or in argument 
History. C. 1953, 77-35-24, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, §1. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law <3=» 911-965. 
24 CJS Criminal Law §§ 1418-1513. 
58 AmJur 2d 199-398, New Trial §§ 15-182. 
Absence of convicted defendant during 
hearing or argument of motion for new trial 
or in arrest of judgment, 69 ALR 2d 835. 
Acceptance of probation, parole, or suspen-
sion of sentence as waiver of error or right to 
appeal or to move for new trial, 117 ALR 929. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for 
filing motion for new trial in criminal case, 
of motion made in due time, 69 ALR 3d 933. 
Appeal by state of order granting new trial 
in criminal case, 95 ALR 3d 596. 
Appeal: participation in, acceptance of, or 
submission to new trial as precluding appel-
late review of order granting it, 67 ALR 2d 
191. 
Attorneys-
Incompetence, negligence, illness or the 
like, of counsel, as a ground for new trial or 
reversal, 64 ALR 436. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship wi th attorney 
in case, or with partner or associate of such 
attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 
64 ALR 3d 126. 
Award of venire de novo or new trial after 
verdict of guilty as to one or more counts and 
acquittal as to another as permitting retrial 
or conviction on latter count, 80 ALR 1106. 
Conspiracy: conviction of one party to 
alleged conspiracy as affected by award of 
new trial to other party or parties, 91 ALR 
2d 710. 
Court reporter-
Death or disability of court reporter before 
transcription or completion of notes or 
record as ground for new trial, 19 ALR 2d 
1098^ 
New trial on ground of reading or refusing 
to read reporter's notes to jury, 50 ALR 2d 
176. 
Double jeopardy: propriety, and effect as 
double jeopardy, of court's grant of new trial 
on own motion in criminal case, 85 ALR 2d 
486. 
Drugs or intoxicants: criminal trial of one 
under influence of drugs or intoxicants at 
time of trial as ground for new trial, 83 ALR 
2d 1067. 
Emotional outbursts: manifestations of 
grief, crying and the like by victim or family 
of victim during criminal trial as ground for 
new trial, 46 ALR 2d 949. 
Habitual criminal: propriety, under statute 
enhancing punishment for second or subse-
quent offense, of restricting new trial to issue 
of status as habitual criminal, 79 ALR 2d 
826. 
Increased punishment: propriety of 
increased punishment on new trial for same 
offense, 12 ALR 3d 978. 
Indigents, right of indigent defendant in 
criminal case to aid of state as regards new 
trial, 55 ALR 2d 1072. 
Judge— 
Comments by judge during examination or 
cross-examination of defendant as ground for 
new trial or reversal, 65 ALR 1270. 
Disparaging remarks: prejudicial effect of 
trial judge's remarks, during criminal trial, 
disparaging accused, 34 ALR 3d 1313. 
Gestures or facial expressions of trial 
judge in criminal case, indicating approval or 
disapproval, belief or disbelief, as ground for 
relief, 49 ALR 3d 1186. 
Mistake: prejudicial effect of statement of 
court that if jury makes mistake in convict-
ing it can be corrected by other authorities, 5 
ALR 3d 574. 
Perjury: statements, comments or conduct 
of court or counsel regarding perjury, as 
ground for new trial or reversal in civil 
action or criminal prosecution other than for 
perjury, 127 ALR 1385. 
Jurors-
Attempt to bribe juror as ground for new 
trial or reversal, 126 ALR 1260. 
Communications between jurors and oth-
ers as ground for new trial or reversal in 
criminal case, 22 ALR 254, 34 ALR 103, 62 
ALR 1466. 
Deafness of juror as ground for new trial, 
15 ALR 2d 534 
Disqualifying relationship unknown to 
juror as ground for new trial in criminal 
case, 116 ALR 679. 
Failure of juror in criminal case to disclose 
his previous jury service within disqualifying 
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criminal charge may, under Sections 76-3-201, 77-27-5, and 77-27-6, be re-
quired to make restitution to the appropriate governmental entities for the 
costs of his extradition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-24, enacted by L. (1); in Subsection (1), deleted, from the end of 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1987, ch. 107, § 3. subsection "not exceeding ten cents a mile for 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1987 amendment all necessary travel and returning such pris-
designated the former provisions of this section oner" and made minor changes in phraseology 
as set out in the bound volume as Subsection and punctuation; and added Subsection (2). 
CHAPTER 31 
UNIFORM RECIPROCAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF 
SUPPORT ACT 
77-31-1. Purposes. 
Law Reviews. — Nordgren v. Mitchell: In-
digent Paternity Defendants' Right to Counsel, 
1982 Utah L. Rev. 933. 
77-31-9. How duties of support enforced. 
A.L.R. — Paternity proceedings: right to 
jury trial, 51 A.L.R.4th 565. 
CHAPTER 32 
COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS 
Section Section 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by 77-32-5. Expenses of printing briefs, deposi-
county for defense of indigent de- tions, and transcripts. 
fendants. 77-32-8. Pro bono criminal representation — 
77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of Liability limits. 
defendant or order of court. 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for de-
fense of indigent defendants. 
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city 
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts 
and various administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
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(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a com-
plete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of 
other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending 
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 1; 1983, ch. 
52, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment 
substituted "substantial probability" for "pos-
sibility" in Subsection (1); and deleted "or 
other serious criminal sanction" at the end of 
Subsection (1). 
Appointment of counsel. 
—Judicial act 
The placement of this section in Title 77 
rather than Title 78 indicates that it is not 
designed to change the inherently judicial act 
of appointing counsel. Edwards v. Hare, 682 F. 
Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
A judge's actions in carrying out the power 
to appoint counsel and set bail, including the 
mechanics of obtaining counsel, are judicial; 
thus where the court was unable to locate 
counsel, its decision to accept accused's plea 
without his having counsel was judicial, and 
any purported failure to carry out a responsi-
bility to obtain counsel and set appropriate bail 
was protected by absolute immunity. Edwards 
v. Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
Law Reviews. — Utah Legislative Survey 
— 1981, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 125, 202. 
Nordgren v. Mitchell: Indigent Paternity De-
fendants' Right to Counsel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 
933. 
Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitu-
tional Protection? Strickland v. Washington 
and National Standards for Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 
723. 
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of 
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal 
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183. 
77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or 
order of court. 
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is under 
arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial probability 
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if: 
(1) The defendant requests it; or 
(2) The court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defen-
dant does not affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be 
represented. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2, enacted by L. In general. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 52, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment 
inserted "there is a substantial probability 
that"; and substituted "is confinement" for 
"could be confinement." 
This section is nothing more than a codifica-
tion of the constitutional rights to assistance of 
counsel and self-representation. State v. Laf-
ferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). 
A.L.R. — What constitutes assertion of r^^ht 
to counsel following Miranda warnings — fed-
eral cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622. 
77-32-5* Expenses of printing briefs, depositions, and tran-
scripts. 
The expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first appeals of right on 
behalf of an indigent defendant, as well as depositions and other transcripts 
shall be paid by the state, county, or municipal agency that prosecuted the 
defendant at trial. 
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ity or agency" in the third sentence, and sub- Security Review Board" for "sentencing court" 
stituted the phrase beginning "under the juris- in the third sentence, and rewrote the fifth sen-
diction" for "at the institution at which he is tence, which had read, "Treatment or other 
hospitalized" at the end of the fourth sentence; care may be provided by an agency of the Divi-
added Subsection (7); in Subsection (8), added sion of Mental Health, or with the approval of 
the subsection designation and in the first sen- the sentencing court, or by any other mental 
tence substituted 'Tsychiatric Security Review health provider"; added Subsection (10); and 
Board" for "hospital facility" and "mental made minor stylistic changes, 
health services provider" for "facility"; in Sub- This section, as effective July 1, 1989, is set 
section (9), divided the first sentence into two out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative 
sentences, substituting the present first sen- Research and General Counsel, 
tence and "The Psychiatric Security Review See the last paragraph of the compiler's note 
Board" for "If a defendant who pleads or is at the beginning of this chapter, 
found guilty and mentally ill is placed on pro- Effective Dates. — Section 9 of Laws 1983, 
bation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing ch. 49 provided: "This act shall take effect upon 
court, the trial judge," substituted "Psychiatric approval." 
77-35-22 to 77-35-25. [Repealed effective July 1, 1990.] 
Repealed effective July 1, 1990. — See 
compiler's note at the beginning of this chap-
ter. 
77-35-26. Rule 26 — Appeals [Repealed effective July 
1, 1990]. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
134 
COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. K* 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) 
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub-
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision 
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2)(b) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to 
(2)(i); added "except those from the small 
claims department of a circuit court" at the end 
of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i). -
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 10GS, in Subsection 
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase, before "except" 
which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them"; deleted "not-
withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Sub-
section (2Kb); designated former Subsections 
(2)(b) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and 
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
"first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
section (2)(f). 
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Rule 59. New Trials; Amendments of Judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part 
of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, 
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry 
of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special 
verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by 
the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result 
of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any 
one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making 
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made under subdivision (1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be 
supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The 
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to 
serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits 
or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
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additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for 
good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a 
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new 
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the 
grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
Rule 6 1 . Harmless Error 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, 
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done 
or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceed-
ing must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
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CANON 3 
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office 
Impartially and Diligently. 
The judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all other activi-
ties. These judicial duties include all the duties of the office prescribed by law. 
In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: 
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. A judge should be unswayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings 
before the court. 
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others who come before the court or 
the judge in the judge's official capacity, and should require similar 
conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to 
judicial direction and control. 
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested 
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, 
and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex 
parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding. A judge may communicate with court staff and/or other 
judges about issues in a case without engaging in inappropriate ex 
parte communication provided that the judge does not abrogate the 
responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court. 
A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on 
the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives 
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the 
advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. 
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court. 
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending 
or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction 
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making 
public statements in the course of their official duties or from ex-
plaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, or recording 
in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during ses-
sions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may 
authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presen-
tation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other 
purposes of judicial administration; or 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of 
investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings. 
(8) A judge should prohibit taking photographs (including motion 
picture and videotape) in the courtroom and areas immediately adja-
cent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, 
except that still photographs of the judge and other court personnel, 
counsel, spectators, parties and witnesses are permissible, subject to 
restrictions specified by the court and subject, in the case of parties 
and witnesses, to their advance consent in writing, provided that the 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The State of Utah versus Edward 
Day, Number 721. First of all, Mr. Halls, the Court will 
grant Mr. Day his motion that the original commitment be 
amended to provide that he was convicted by Judge Trial of 
the crime, and he cannot — It states that he entered a 
plea of guilty, which is wrong. 
MR. DAY: On the others, Your Honor, could I 
motion — 
THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Day. We'll 
get to you in just a second. 
So if you'll draw an amendment that states that he was 
convicted at a Judge Trial, and that the balance of the 
commitment will stand as stated? 
Now, Mr. Day, you filed a Motion for a New Trial? 
MR. DAY: Yes, sir. On this motion I would 
like to present to the Court a Motion for a Continuance. 
THE COURT: Well, the biggest problem you 
have with your Motion for a New Trial — Just step back 
away from the bench, please. 
MR. DAY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: (Continuing) — is the fact that 
our Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that first of all 
2 
1 your motion must be accompanied by Affidavits, telling us 
2 what the new evidence is. Secondly, it must be done within 
3 ten days for the commitment. When did we commit you? 
4 MR. DAY: October 6th of ^87, sir. 
5 THE COURT: Yes. Over a year ago. 
6 MR. DAY: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: That's hardly within ten days, is 
it, sir? 
MR. DAY: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that same observation -
- new evidence? Is it any different? I don't see anything 
in the statute where I can see anything different. As I 
recall that statute, it's 77-35-24. Rule 24 states: "The 
8 
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10 
11 
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I Court may, upon motion of party or upon its own initiative, 
grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse affect 
upon the rights of a party. The motion for a new trial 
shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall 
be .^accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential 
facts in support of the motion." You didn't file any 
affidavits. You didn't tell us about any fact in support of 
22 I your motion. In addition: "If additional time is required 
23 to procure affidavits or evidence, the Court may postpone 
2 4 the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
25 i reasonable. A motion for a new trial shall be made within 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
ten days after imposition of sentence." 
MR. DAY: I went by the Federal Rules when I 
made the motion. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know if the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure for Federal Court has anything to do 
with this. That doesn't have anything to do with this. The 
Federal Rules have only application to federal crimes, you 
see. 
MR. DAY: Then do I have a right to appeal 
your decision to deny me this way? 
THE COURT: Well, I guess you do. I can't 
tell you what to do, Mr. Day. I don't practice law, so I 
can't advise you. The law says I can't practice law, 
because then I'm passing judgment on my own practice. 
So in view of the fact the Motion for a New Trial was -
- the rules were not complied with, and timeliness, the 
Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
(Whereupon, this completes the hearing on 
this matter.) 
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